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Introduction
The foundations for the overall American vision of the Russian Revolution—
the revolution that, according to the American observers, the society needed for 
its political renewal and progress—were laid precisely during the period of the 
First Russian Revolution (1905-1907). This revolution became the climax of the 
first American crusade for Russia’s democratization, initiated at the close of the 
19th century by Russian political immigrants and by George Kennan, the Liberal 
journalist who had made a journey to Siberia and acquainted the West with the 
punitive system of the Tsarist regime1. As it watched the Russian Revolution un-
fold, the American society lived through its first cycle of hopes (concerning the 
prospects of Russia’s modernization/westernization) and disappointments (with 
its results); as a consequences the Russian Empire became the object of the US 
world-reforming mission.
This article will be structured so as to follow through the distinct stages of 
this “cycle of hopes and disappointments”. When the cycle was on the upswing, 
it was, as a rule, dominated by liberal universalist myths that framed the image of 
the romantic Russian “Other” and shaped the range of meanings peculiar to the 
liberal universalist discourse: about the Russians’ ability to carry out Western-
type revolutions and to create “the United States of Russia”, about the essentially 
democratic Russian society that was dominated by the xenophobic and retrograde 
government, and about the Americans taking an important part in the process 
of reforming Russia. When the cycle was on the downswing, it was, as a rule, 
1 For details about the first wave of the American “crusade for Russian freedom” at 
the end of the 19th century, see: Victoria I. Zhuravleva, Ponimanie Rossii v SShA: Obrazy 
i Mify, 1881-1914 (Moscow: Russian State Humanitarian University, 2012), 149-209; 
David S. Foglesong, The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”. The Crusade for a 
“Free Russia” since 1881 (Сambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-33. On 
George Kennan’s personal “crusade for Russian freedom”, see: Frederick F. Travis, George 
Kennan and American-Russian Relationship. 1865-1924 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1990).
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dominated by Russophobic myths that played an important part in maintaining the 
image of the demonic Russian “Other” and shaped the range of meanings peculiar 
to the conservative pessimistic discourse : about the Russian political system as 
essentially authoritarian due to the peculiarities of the Russian national character ; 
about Russia’s imperial ambitions and the implementation of the “Russian way” 
that had negative consequences for the US foreign policy interests and for the 
entire civilized community. 
The first and all the subsequent American “cycles of hopes and disappoint-
ments” about Russia2 are impossible to explain outside of the American context. 
It is this context that has determined and still determines the hierarchy of Russia’s 
images, placing some of them at the center of the stage and delegating others to the 
periphery. This article does not consider all the existing images, but instead focuses 
on the central ones (of the “demonic” and “romantic” type) that reflected the current 
agenda of the American society and the socio-cultural traditions of its development.
The methodological framework of the article is grounded in the findings of 
social constructivism and is focused on comparative study of background ideas, 
images, cognitive stereotypes, and myths that operate at the normative level in a 
given national environment, as well as on the study of communicative traditions 
that are imprinted in the cultural and historical memory of a nation and use the 
conceptual pair “Self/Other.”3
Given such a methodological framework, the author does not limit her task to 
studying the process of mutual perception through the lens of narrative analysis—
a customary tool for describing images of other cultures that allows us to assess 
the difference between the American images and the Russian reality. Rather, she 
strives to answer a broader set of questions. Why were the Americans imagining 
the Russian revolution in a given way and not in other ways? What kinds of dis-
cursive practices were used to create an image of the Russian revolution? What 
was the logic of verbal and visual writing used for its construction? Finally, what 
role did it play in the identity formation of the American society? Hence, we are 
talking not only about reflection, but also about self-reflection, since the answer to 
the why question is found in the American political and sociocultural context that 
engendered these images of other nations. The socio-cultural context helps us to 
determine the identity markers that have become dominant in the American soci-
2 The next cycle after 1905-07 took place between the 1917 February and October 
revolutions; the last one (so far) has followed the collapse of the USSR and the end of the 
Cold War.
3 In creating a methodological base, the author relied especially heavily on the work 
of those scholars who based their studies of identity problems in international relations 
on the concept of dialogism introduced by Mikhail Bakhtin. This framework posits the 
existence of the “Other” as a necessary condition for defining the “Self” and includes 
research on mental geography with an emphasis on the study of mythologization of 
time and space as well as studies that present the US foreign policy as a field of identity 
construction and analyze the ideological and cultural dimensions of this policy. The author 
list for the former current includes such researchers as Tzvetan Todorov, Edward Said, 
Larry Wolff, Iver Neumann, Alexander Wendt; the latter current is represented, among 
other authors, by Emily Rosenberg, Michael Hunt, David Campbell, and Walter Hixson. 
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ety in the long run. The American political context (or the agenda)—the specific 
configuration of domestic and foreign policy issues that are important at a given 
stage of development of the American society—explains the mechanisms through 
which the Russian «Other» is being used. 
In terms of the sociocultural context, it has to be said that Americans could 
not remain indifferent to revolutions outside of the United States, because, ever 
since the US was founded, its inhabitants thought it to be their mission to present 
their country to the world as the ideal model of political regime that arose from 
an ideal kind of revolution. They became ever more convinced of their right to 
world leadership as they watched the unsuccessful attempts of other nations to 
reproduce their experience. France had spectacularly failed this test for the first 
time at the end of the 18th century and then again in 1848 and in 1870-71. The 
Latin American revolutions of the early 19th century were the worst nightmares 
of their northern neighbor come true. The Russians’ turn to prove that they were 
capable of producing a true American-style revolution came in 1905, during the 
third revolutionary wave of 1890s-1910s, that also swept Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Mexico, and China.
Michael Hunt, an American scholar, points to two different manners of evalu-
ating the revolution that were used in the US and whose origins can be traced, 
respectively, to John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. John Adams feared the revo-
lution that went over limits, when its destructive potential broke forth, and the 
revolutionaries were unable to protect society from anarchy and arbitrary power. 
By contrast, Thomas Jefferson saw the revolution as a cleansing hurricane that 
was beneficial to society. Over time, these two visions grew closer, since they 
both emerged from the same American revolutionary heritage. Both focused on 
the constitutional phase of the revolution as the final one. The capacity of the 
French and later of the Slavs to make a successful revolution was seen as an indi-
cator of their readiness to become leaders of civilization development4.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the American society was living through 
the Progressivist era. Although Progressivism clearly influenced both the domes-
tic and the foreign US policy, it was a rather amorphous ideological movement 
that was based on various strands of reformist ideas and on the faith in prog-
ress. The Progressivists’ reformist zeal was focused on the spheres of industrial 
development and urban environment, as well as on various aspects of the US 
domestic political life and foreign policy. Progressivist leaders dreamt of lead-
ing the Nation (and with it the whole world) out of the late-19th century state of 
social chaos and into progress, with the help of the State and of the scientific and 
professional approaches to social problems. Progressivist ideas have stimulated 
a more active state involvement into the American foreign-policy expansion and 
have strengthened the Americans’ sense of a civilizing mission that their country 
undertook in order to bring progress to all regions of the world. However, the 
mechanisms of this civilizing mission toward the backward countries remained 
the subject of internal debate among the Progressivists: while some advocated the 
4 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987), 92-98.
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use of military interventions, others proposed softer tactics, such as the promotion 
of education and Protestant faith through missionary activities and the spread of 
mass consumption goods. While the first group opted for the guns, the second 
chose school manuals, the Bible, the sowing and the reaping machines. This turn-
of-the-century debate has remained important for the US foreign-policy makers 
and ideologues up to the present days.
The idea of the American mission attracted the national attention to the revo-
lutionary movements and the political changes abroad; Progressivists believed 
that the American democratic government had to be useful not only at home, 
but also in other countries. Calls for domestic reforms and sacrifices in the name 
of greater justice for the less successful members of the American society were 
easily transformed into the demands for overseas “crusades” and missionary cam-
paigns that would remake the world in the US image and likeness. The process of 
internalization of the American reformism has acquired new momentum, and the 
contemporaries took it as a sign of its success. 
Taking part in Russia’s modernization and in its first revolution had become 
an important component of the Progressivist reform movement, since these pro-
cesses fitted the Americans’ image of their own revolutionary heritage. Yet, it has 
to be noted that what stood behind the harsh tone and demands were plans for 
relatively moderate reforms, the Puritan worldview, and the patriotic fears related 
to the destruction of the traditional American ideals by the modern political and 
economic system (which produced an energetic rejection of the anarchist and the 
socialist varieties of radicalism). Actions were indeed taken to raise funds for the 
victims of Jewish pogroms or for the Russian political figures who undertook pro-
paganda campaigns in the US. Yet, at times, the rhetoric became more important 
than the actions, and the crusading spirit of the Progressivist epoch could rapidly 
turn into disenchantment. The Russians had learned all of this first-hand during 
the 1905-07 Revolution. 
The progress ideology influenced both the reformers and their more con-
servative compatriots. However, the process of observing Russia’s revolutionary 
experience made the differences in their positions all the more apparent both in 
their interpretations of events and in their judgements about the reasonable limits 
of social and political changes. 
The author based her analyses on primary sources of different types ; press 
materials, including political cartoons, hold a special place among them. The 
main characteristics of a political cartoon relevant for this research are : its close 
connections with the engendering socio-cultural context, its timeliness, since a 
cartoonist, like a political journalist, always reacts to the current internal and in-
ternational political situation, its disregard for the political and social taboos, its 
symbolism and grotesque style. A satirical drawing speaks to the emotional per-
ceptions of the recipient audience, translates the facts from the language of logical 
concepts to that of visual images, and allows to express ideas that are at times 
difficult to verbalize.
Typologically, the cartoons analyzed in this article can be classified as “car-
toons of opinion”. They appeared in newspapers and magazines of different party 
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affinities and regional origins. The author’s analysis of the political cartoons as 
historical sources includes such aspects as the manner of its presentation, the lan-
guage and symbolism of the cartoon and of its verbal component (the name, the 
caption, and the speech bubbles), its relationship with other texts about Russia, its 
location within the print issue—the cover, the center spread, or the editorial page ; 
within the text of the relevant article or apart from it (in the former case the impact 
on the reader is stronger). Special attention is paid to the moods of the Americans 
themselves (the American context) and to the evolution of their representations.5
The author’s observations and conclusions about the image of the Russian 
Revolution in American political cartoons are based on reviews of newspaper 
and magazine collections at the US Library of Congress. The political drawings 
of then-famous cartoonists that have become the quintessence of press attitudes 
are analyzed in greater detail. These artists belong to what is rightly considered 
“the Golden Age” of the American political cartoon, which comes to its heyday 
in the three comic weeklies—the democratic “Puck”, the independent “Life”, and 
the Republican “Judge”—that have made a true revolution in political cartoon-
drawing. At the turn of the 20th century political cartoons began to spread through 
the newspapers as well6.
For this particular research theme, cartoon analysis allows not only to detect 
the hidden evaluations that the Americans made about Russia, its historical past 
and future, but also to determine with greater accuracy the timing of real changes 
within the American society with respect to the Russian Revolution, since politi-
cal cartoons both illustrate the current attitudes, prejudices, and stereotypes of the 
public to which they are addressed and at the same time serve to construct new 
social preferences. 
Political cartoons, due to their specific genre, are a convenient mechanism for 
maintaining the “one-dimensional” perception of Russia, for emphasizing one set 
of components seen in the Russian reality and for downplaying other such sets, 
and also for visually framing long-standing American myths about Russia and 
Russians. Yet this is precisely what makes cartoons a valuable source for discern-
ing long-standing trends of Americans’ views on Russian Revolution determined 
not only by the Russian context, but also by the self-representations of Americans 
themselves.
In 1903-1905, the time of the first crisis in Russian-American relations whose 
main facets were the Kishinev pogrom, the conflict in the Far East, and the 1905-
5 On the methodology of cartoon analysis and their use as a historical source see, 
for example, Thomas M. Kemnitz, “The Cartoon as a Historical Source,” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 4 (Summer,1973): 81-93; Ernst H. Gombrich, “The Cartoonist’s 
Armory,” South Atlantic Quarterly 62, no 2 (1963): 189-228; Zhuravleva, Foglesong, 
“Konstruirovanie obraza Rossii v amerikanskoy politicheskoy karikature XX veka,” in: 
Vadim A. Koleneko, ed., Mify i realii amerikanskoy istorii v periodike XVIII-XX vv., vol. 1 
of 3 (Moscow: Institute of World History RAN, 2008): 187-193.
6 Frank L.Mott, American Journalism. A History of Newspapers in the United States 
Through 250 Years. 1690 to 1940 (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 512, 581-587; Stephen 
Hess, Sandy Northrop, Drawn and Quartered. The History of American Political Cartoons 
(Montgomery, Elliott & Clark Publishing, 1996), 59-60, 64-79.
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07 Revolution, hardly any issue of a newspaper or magazine that had an editorial 
cartoonist on staff came out without a “Russian” cartoon. The Russo-Japanese 
war had undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the “Russian theme” dominated 
the subjects of international cartoons. The themes of war and revolution were in-
extricably linked in American representations, while the use of dichotomies such 
as “East-West” and “Barbarism-Civilization”, the spreading of pro-Japanese at-
titudes through the American society and the position that the Washington admin-
istration occupied during the conflict in the Far East had facilitated the casting of 
the Japanese as the “Yankee of the East” and of Japan—as the catalyst of Russian 
Revolution. Thus, the Americans had symbolically “expelled” the Russian Em-
pire from the “club of civilized powers”, while the Westernized Japan was, albeit 
temporarily, admitted into it.7
In 1904-1905, American public and political figures, religious activists and 
reformers, journalists and cartoonists started the first “image war” against the 
official Russia in the history of Russian-American relations, and honed the tech-
niques of verbal and visual messaging that have been used ever since and up to 
the present day.8 
I. “The United States of Russia”: on the wave of hopes 
By the second half of 1904, serious and passionate talk about an impending 
revolution in Russia had begun in the US. In October 1904, the Society of Ameri-
can Friends of Russian Freedom (SAFRF)9 reemerged in Boston and began work-
ing at its full capacity, summoning a mass meeting in New York, whose attendants 
denounced the Tsarist government’s domestic policy and declared that Americans 
were ready to make their contribution to the cause of Russia’s liberalization. The 
7 This idea was a constant in the publications of George Kennan, who supported 
his conclusions with references to Russian history, in which wars laid bare all the 
weaknesses of the regime, stimulated the popular discontent and usually ended in reforms 
or revolutionary explosions. See George Kennan, “The Social and Political Condition of 
Russia»”; “The Economic and Financial Condition of Russia,” Outlook Vol. 76 (January 
1904): 211-216, 261-265. See also: “The Emancipator of Russia,” Outlook Vol. 80, (June 
1905): 357; Edmund Noble, “America and the Russian Crisis,” Free Russia (March, 1905): 
35. For editorial cartoons see, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 24, 30, 1905; Brooklyn 
Eagle, January 27, 1905 ; Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1905; Philadelphia Inquirer, 
February 23, April 1, May 14, 1905 ; Chicago Inter-Ocean, March 12, 1905; Life, March 
9, 1905.
8 For a more detailed account, see, Zhuravleva, Ponimanie Rossii v SShA, 544-568.
9 This society was modeled on the English SAFRF and was first created in Boston 
in 1891, through the efforts of the Russian revolutionary, Sergei Mikhailovich Stepniak-
Kravchinsky and with the support of progressive American activists, whose ranks were 
dominated by former Abolitionists. In 1892, the American SAFRF began publishing “Free 
Russia”. In 1894, after the defeat of its campaign for the denunciation of the Extradition 
Treaty that the Russian Empire and the US signed in 1887 and that the Senate ratified in 
1893, the activity level of the SAFRF and of the first wave of the American movement for 
Russian freedom began to decrease. This treaty gave the Tsarist government the right to 
demand the extradition of Russian revolutionaries that sought refuge in America, because 
it excluded regicides and their accomplices from the category of political criminals.
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assembled held up to shame the despotism and the expansionism of the Tsarist 
government and encouraged their compatriots to create Societies of Friends of 
Russia Freedom all over the United States.10
Russian Liberals and Radicals that crossed the ocean in order to canvass 
American support for their fight to free Russia helped to convince Americans that 
Russian Revolution was going to be a constructive movement of the Western type. 
First and foremost among them were Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov, a historian and 
a future leader of the Constitutional Democrats’ Party, and Ekaterina Konstanti-
novna Breshko-Breshkovskaya, one of the leading Socialist-Revolutionaries who 
spent most of her life in prison and exile and became a true symbol of freedom 
fighting in Russia.
Miliukov was giving a series of lectures in the United States between 1903 
and 1905, when he found himself in the middle of the first crisis in Russian-Amer-
ican relation. The image of the Russian Revolution, which he created, was that 
of a liberal-constitutionalist movement; it helped to feed the existing American 
illusions about Russia’s prospects for political modernization and its readiness 
to adopt the Western development model. How could it be otherwise, if every 
Russian schoolboy knew Abraham Lincoln’s biography and admired this emanci-
pator-President?11 Russia and Its Crisis, the book based on Miliukov’s American 
lectures, made an important contribution in forming the Americans’ ideas about 
the meaning and the contours of the Russian Revolution, while Miliukov seemed 
to be just the kind of Western-style revolutionary that they held so dear.12
Breshko-Breshkovskaya also assured her American public that a revolution 
was inevitable in Russia. In speeches that she gave at mass meetings, clubs, col-
leges, and private receptions, she avoided mentioning the terrorist methods used 
by the Socialists- Revolutionaries party, its peasant insurrection program, and the 
thorny issues of political assassination and radical revolution. Instead, she fo-
cused her attention on the fight for civil rights and freedoms, on transferring land 
ownership to the people, and on the political growth of the peasants through their 
participation in zemstvos. She never tired of repeating that the Russian people 
would know how to use their freedom wisely, were aiming for a social revolution 
that would establish a democratic form of government, and were more than ever 
in need of moral and material support from across the Atlantic.13
10 “The Awakening of Russia,” Review of Reviews Vol. 30, (July 1904): 90; J.F. Green, 
“The Cause of Russian Freedom in the USA,” Free Russia (November 1904): 88; Alice S. 
Blackwell, “The Friends of Russian Freedom,” Free Russia (April, 1906):10.
11  Pavel N. Miliukov, Memuary (Moscow: Political Literature Publishers, 1991):145, 
148; “Talks of Situation in Russia,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 14, 1905
12 Pavel Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905): 
7-12. The author of the New York Times review of this book whose publication coincided 
with the Tsar’s August manifesto welcomed Miluikov’s main proposition about Russia 
being in the state flux and development that contradicted the myth of the “Immutable 
Russia”: New York Times, August 26, 1905. See also the book review from Nation, “The 
Russian Crisis,” Nation 82 (January 1906): 57-58
13 Emma Goldman, Living My Life, in 2 volumes, volume 1 (New York, Da Capo 
Press, 1970): 362; Blackwell, “Welcome to a Russian Woman,” Woman’s Journal Vol. 35 
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Breshko-Breshkovskaya’s visit facilitated the creation of an SAFRF branch 
in New York. Together, the New York and the Boston branches became the opera-
tion centers of the renewed and expanding American crusade for the creation of a 
Free Russia. After the onset of the Russian Revolution, the New York chapter of 
the SAFRF became one of the main centers of the movement for Russia’s democ-
ratization, as it broadened the scale of its activities and extended its membership 
to the members of the Jewish community and to all sorts of Progressive-era re-
formers. The latter were attracted to the SAFRF, since, according to the Progres-
sivism ideology, supporting the fight for freedom beyond the US borders aided the 
cause of preserving freedom and democracy at home.
Overall, the Liberals and the Radicals who came to the US from Russia to 
boost support for their political causes were equally effective in fostering, a la 
George Kennan, an oversimplified picture of the Russian Revolutionary move-
ment and in creating the romantic myth of the Russian Revolution aimed at found-
ing “the United States of Russia” and at repeating the American experience. These 
simplistic representations fed the American messianic mood, created false illu-
sions, and subsequently provoked a relatively fast transition from a universalist 
euphoria to pessimistic evaluations of Russia’s overall revolutionary prospects 
and its revolutionary leaders.
After the “Bloody Sunday” of January 1905, the images of official-reaction-
ary Russia and of popular-revolutionary Russia turned into two parallel realities 
in the representations of the American observers. An overwhelming majority in 
the US press had harshly condemned the shooting of a peaceful demonstration 
in Saint-Petersburg, seeing it as a display of medieval cruelty.14 This attitude and 
the spread of false information about thousands of victims15 also became reflected 
in the political cartoons that in their turn had helped to “barbarize” the image of 
Nicholas II. Some represented him as a satrap, up to his knees in blood of his 
subjects who received a load of lead instead of freedom and no longer trusted 
their ruler. In others, he appeared as Humpty Dumpty who fell from the wall of 
public veneration for “the Little Father” or as a passenger of the “Russia” ship that 
(December 1904): 401; “Sympathy for Russian People,” Providence Journal, February 
23, 1905.
14 “The Massacre in St. Petersburg,” Outlook, Vol. 79 (January 1905); 201; “World-
Politics,” North American Review Vol. 180 (March 1905): 461-466; “Loyalty to Czar Turns 
to Hatred,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 19, 1905; Noble, “America and the Russian 
Crisis,” Free Russia (March 1905): 34-35.
15 “Troops Slay Two Thousands and Wound Five Thousands in St. Petersburg Streets,” 
San Francisco Chronicle, January 23, 1905. According to the official sources, there were 
130 dead and 299 wounded (these figures were given in the report made by the Director 
of the Police Department to the Minister of Internal Affairs). See Revolutsiya 1905-1907 
gg. v Rossii: dokumenty i materialy Vol. 4, Book 1 (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of 
the USSR, 1961), 103, 118. Subsequent research cites the revised figures of 200 dead 
and 800 wounded. See Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution. Agony of the Old Regime. 
1905-1917 (Russian translation) (Moscow, ROSPEN, 1994), 35. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
historiography propagated the figure of 4600 dead and wounded that was presented by 
Vladimir Lenin in the 18th issue of the Forward periodical, published on January 31, 1905.
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was hit by the “Saint-Petersburg” mine, with other mines—“Poland”, “Finland”, 
“Caucasus”, and “Moscow” at the ready around him. Yet others made him into an 
“Autocracy” scarecrow, surrounded by a pack of bloodthirsty wolves—“Official 
Oppression”, “Military Cruelty”, and “Bureaucracy”.16
Dissonant notes in this chorus were sounded by the publications of the New 
York Herald, a newspaper that belonged to James Gordon Bennett Jr. and whose 
staff had been in contact with the Russian Embassy in Washington since 1901, and 
also by the reports of the Saint-Petersburg correspondent of the Associated Press 
that tended to support the Russian authorities.17
The New York branch of SAFRF helped to organize a mass rally at the Music 
Academy of New York. After seeing Bartley Campbell’s melodrama Siberia, the 
moved public sang “La Marseillaise” and shouted: “Death to the Tsar!” The Rus-
sians, the Poles, the Jews, and the Finns were prevailing groups among those who 
took part in this rally, although many Americans were there as well. Meetings of 
this kind were also held in Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities.18
The visual conception of the Russian Emperor that existed in the USA dur-
ing the First Russian Revolution was constructed with the aid of two personal 
precedent images. The first image—that of Louis XVI—became a warning to 
the Russian Emperor not to repeat the mistakes that had cost the French king 
his head. Thus, Joseph Keppler’s 
cartoon has the shadow of Louis 
XVI warning Nicholas II, seated 
on his throne and surrounded by 
darkness: “Warily, Brother”. The 
shadow points to the image of a 
guillotine—reminder of his execu-
tion by the risen French people 
and of the fate that awaits the Rus-
sian Emperor, should he not hurry 
to answer his people’s plea for re-
forms (represented as several pairs 
of hands raised towards the throne 
with a scroll of “Petitions”).19 
(Figure 1)
Thomas Sullivant from the 
San Francisco Examiner gave an-
16 See the editorial cartoons in the Chicago Daily Tribune, January 23, 24, 1905; 
Philadelphia Inquirer, January 30, 1905; New York World, January 30, 1905; New York 
American, January 25, 1905. See also the cartoon compilation in the Literary Digest Vol. 
30 (February 4 and 11 1905):154-155, 195.
17 Rossiya i SShA: Diplomaticheskie otnosheniya v 1900-1917 gg., Grigorii N. 
Sevostianov, ed. (Moscow: MFD, 1999): 363-364 ; Goldman, Living My Life, 359.
18 “Cry Death to Czar at Big Mass Meeting,” New York Times, January 30, 1905.
19 Puck, February 8, 1905 (cover).
Figure 1: A Voice from the past
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other interpretation of the same idea and by adding to the shadows of Louis XVI 
and Marie Antoinette, executed during the French Revolution, that of Charles I 
who fell during the English Revolution. The three shadows point to the smoking 
ruins around the enthroned Nicholas II and caution him not to repeat their sad 
fate.20
The other precedent historical image used at that time was the figure of Ivan 
the Terrible. John McCutcheon’s cartoon has this tsar move the hand of Nicho-
las II as he is signing the order to shoot the peaceful demonstration and look-
ing at the portrait of Louis XVI. McCutcheon portrayed Ivan the Terrible as 
the founder of the Romanov imperial dynasty, even though Ivan died 29 years 
before this  dynasty came to power. The cartoonist did not care about making 
this historical substitution: what mattered was the invariant of perception of 
this precedent name, activated through a graphical representation.21 (Figure 2)
20 San Francisco Examiner, February 3, 1905.
21 Chicago Daily Tribune, January 24, 1905.
Figure 2: The spirit of the first of the Romanoff seems to be the power behind the throne.
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It must be noted that the English translation of the tsar’s name (“Ivan the 
Terrible”) had a very clear negative connotation, and his image functioned as a 
semantic code that fixed the perception of “medieval” and “uncivilized” methods 
of government used in the Russian Empire and of its autocratic ruler’s “bloody 
deeds”. In general, the opposition “Medievalism vs. Modernity” became one of 
the favorite communicative strategies used in American visual representations of 
the Russian Revolution.
Meanwhile, the American Russophiles who advocated modernization from 
above, since it would preserve the unique Russian culture and the unity between 
the Tsar and the people, wrote with much enthusiasm about the readiness of the 
Russian Emperor to promulgate reforms. Their high spirits were boosted by three 
decrees that Nicholas II had signed in February, in which he exhorted the popula-
tion to help the authorities to restore order, invited opinions on questions of State-
building, and instructed the Minister of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Grigorievich 
Bulygin, to write a draft law about the creation of a legislative-consultative body 
that was soon christened as “Bulygin’s Duma”. 
Charles Emory Smith, the US ex-envoy to Russia who had done a great deal 
to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries during his time in Saint-
Petersburg, wrote in an article that Russia was a country of extraordinary contrasts 
and that its history was as multi-faceted as its reality: “It is illuminated with the 
progressive measures of the great Emancipator. It is darkened with the shadows 
of the Kishinev and the Finnish oppression. The far-reaching reforms which are 
now dawning on the nation give promise of a new and more hopeful era. Russia 
has prodigious recuperative power; […] and if through the disasters she is now 
suffering she shall through of the shackles of the bureaucracy that have weight 
her down and come to share the progressive spirit of the age, she will through 
present tribulations and final regeneration enter, as we hope she may, on a new 
and brighter epoch.”22
However, it soon became clear that the concessions made by Nicholas II were 
half-hearted, and that he was so hesitant and so late in making them that they 
were counterproductive and only caused further discontent. The American press 
wrote that Russia’s road to freedom was filled with pogroms, massacres, and as-
sassination attempts, while Nicholas II lacked the wisdom to grant his people 
their freedom, and the people no longer trusted him. By consequence, anarchy and 
violence replaced law and order, respect for life and property disappeared, class 
rose against class and race against race, and various regions of the country were 
falling into a civil war of the worst kind.23
22 Charles E. Smith, “Russia,” The National Geographic Magazine Vol.16, no 2 
(February 1905): 63.
23 Emile J. Dillon, “Progress of the Russian Revolution,” Review of Reviews Vol. 
32 (August 1905): 202. See also: “The Condition of Russia,” Quarterly Review Vol. 202 
(April 1905): 581-606; “Progress of Revolution Spirit,” Review of Reviews Vol. 31 (May 
1905): 536; “Changing Russia (Topics of the Time),” Century Vol. 69 (April 1905): 954-
955; “World-Politics,” North American Review Vol. 181 (August 1905): 309-310.
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The June issue of the Chicago Daily Tribune opened with John McCutcheon’s 
cartoon, in which Nicholas II was drowning under the rain of “Revolution”. His 
tiny figure could hardly be seen next to a pair of enormous “State boots”. The 
cartoonist’s idea was made clear by the caption: “Wanted—a Washington, a Napo-
leon, or a Bismarck”—anyone of these three could fill the shoes that are too big for 
the Russian Tsar who was too petty and narrow-minded to handle the State prob-
lems in Russia.24 Frederick Morgan, the cartoonist of the Philadelphia Inquirer 
also used an American precedent image, but instead of George Washington he 
referred the reader to the President-Emancipator Abraham Lincoln. In his drawing, 
the Russian people appear as a figure tied to a pillory by the chains of autocracy. 
Next to the figure there is a soup bowl with the inscription “Promise of Reforms”; 
the caption “Wanted—A Lincoln” refers the reader to the American development 
model: the Russian people are waiting for a Russian Lincoln that would come and 
deliver them from political slavery25. Thus the communicative strategy “Freedom 
vs. Slavery” found its visual representation in the American cartoon drawings.
The “romantic” image of the people’s Russia was being constructed in paral-
lel with the “demonic” image of the official Russia—the reign of darkness, despo-
tism, and arbitrary power, of the country that a deceitful ruler and a mediocre gov-
ernment were pushing into the abyss of chaos and defeat. The American society 
was living through a period of genuine enchantment with the Russian revolution 
and placed its best hopes on the Liberals who, it was thought, could best accom-
plish its main purpose—introduce political reforms and establish a constitutional 
government. This Universalist euphoria overshadowed not only the doubts that 
the American Liberal-Universalists had as to whether the Russian “dark people” 
were sufficiently enlightened and prepared to take part in the government process, 
but also the Conservative perceptions of the “Immutable Russia” that emphasized 
its “alien” and “Eastern” nature. All these fears and doubts were eclipsed by the 
“romantic” image of Russia—a country ripe for political revolution and religious 
modernization and ready to adopt the Western development model. What the 
Americans had to do was to help Russia to secure itself on this path. 
The divergence among the images of the Russian Revolution created by the 
Conservative, Liberal-Universalist, and Radical discourses would only become 
evident later, by the early 1906. Yet, during the early phases of the First Russian 
Revolution, the different political currents were in relative agreement that the pe-
culiarities of Russian development trajectory and national character would not 
impede the progress of freedom through the Russian Empire. According to the 
Saturday Evening Post, cities, towns, and farmsteads all over the United States 
were unanimous in their condemnation of the official Russia.26 The pages of the 
American newspapers and magazines were full of images of Russian people ris-
ing from dark dungeons to fight for their rights and freedom, struggling to break 
the bondage of the Romanov dynasty, coming to the helm of the State ship, cutting 
the tentacles of “Despotism”, “Religious Intolerance”, “Exile”, “Cossackism”, 
24 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 1, 1905.
25 Philadelphia Inquirer, February 13, 1905.
26 Saturday Evening Post, May 27, 1905.
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“Greed”, “Incompetence”, and “Oppressive Taxation” from the “Bureaucracy” 
octopus, urgently knocking the door of the “Department of Justice” and rightly 
demanding reforms, or coming out of the “Revolution” bottle like a genie.27 
Charles Bush managed to create the image that synthesized the sentiments of 
the American society in the days of its enchantment with the Russian Revolution 
and propagated them : Russia is called to arise and fight by a woman with a sword 
in her arm and a Phrygian hat on her head—an object that, since the end of the 18th 
century, symbolized not only freedom, but also revolution.28 (Figure 3)
27 Harper’s Weekly Vol. 49 (February, 1905): cover; Atlanta Constitution, February 4, 
1905; Life (June 22, 1905): cover; New York World, February 6, May 31, 1905; Chicago 
Daily Tribune, June 5, 1905; Puck (June 21, 1905): two-page spread; see also the cartoon 
from the Columbus Evening Dispatch, reprinted in the Literary Digest Vol. 30 (June 17, 
1905): 882.
28 New York World, May 31, 1905.
Figure 3: Arise! 
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This cartoon could have been a perfect illustration for Edwin Markham’s 
poem Russia, Arise!, first published in 1905:
This is the hour; awake, arise!
A whisper on the Volga flies;
A wild hope on the Baltic lips,
A terror over the Neva creeps; 
A joy is in the trail that goes
Reddening the white Siberian snows;
The cliffs of Caucasus are stirred
With the glad wonder of a word;
The white wave of the Caspian speaks,
And Ural answers from her peaks,
The Kremlin bells in all their powers
Wait trembling for the Hour of Hours,
When they shall cry the People’s will—
Cry Marathon and Bunker Hill.29
It is no accident that the Battle of Bunker Hill appears in the poem, since this 
was the first great battle of the War for Independence between the British troops 
and the American Colonists. Even though the British forces gained victory that 
day, their losses (1054 dead) were much greater than those suffered by the Colo-
nists (450 dead). This battle raised the morale of the Americans who in 1776 were 
beginning to make their own revolution that successfully concluded in 1789 with 
the adoption of the US Constitution and the creation of a new state.
The press publications of that time were full of analogies between the Amer-
ican and the Russian Revolutions. The Americans were searching for Russian 
“Founding Fathers” among the characters of the 1905 historical drama. Some 
thought to find them in zemtsy with their “bill of rights”, others presented Pavel 
Nikolaevich Miliukov as a new George Washington, yet others pointed to Sergei 
Yulievich Witte who, after a visit to the US, drafted the text of the October 17 Man-
ifesto and was preparing a draft law on the elections of the Duma deputies.30 The 
“Bloody Sunday” victims were compared with those of the “Boston massacre”31, 
while the shadow of Patrick Henry32 hovered over the Tsar’s domain33. The pro-
29 Cited from: St. John Sun, July 30, 1906.
30 Arthur W. Thompson, Robert A. Hart, The Uncertain Crusade: America and the 
Russian Revolution of 1905 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1970), 25.
31 The Boston massacre—the clash between British and Colonial troops that took 
place in Boston on March 5, 1770 and left five Americans dead. This event catalyzed the 
consolidation of the patriotic movement in the American Colonies.
32 Patrick Henry—member of the legislative body of the Virginia Colony, and one 
of the radical-wing leaders of the patriotic movement in the Colonies. His famous phrase 
“Give me liberty or give me death” became the battle call for the champions of American 
Independence. 
33 Thompson, Hart, The Uncertain Crusade, 30, 34, 100. See also: Outlook Vol. 79 
(January, 1905): 218. Some authors went as far as trying to trace the influence of Theodore 
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gressive magazine Arena, well-known for its social-reformist orientation, insisted 
that the Russian people were capable of making a political revolution and ready 
for self-government, and that wise and intelligent leaders akin to Thomas Jeffer-
son, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington would promptly appear on the 
revolutionary stage.34 All in all, the American observers thought that the Russians 
were fast approaching their analogue of the American 1776. The main hopes were 
obviously placed on the Liberals who would direct the reform process and defend 
the cause of freedom from extremist attacks from both the Left and the Right.35
Meanwhile, in winter and spring of 1905, US religious leaders felt very in-
spired by the idea of a religious reform that would lead to freedom of worship in 
Russia. While the Catholic publications expressed hopes that the Lithuanians and 
the Poles could improve their situation, members of Protestant Churches argued 
that the spread of Protestantism would become part and parcel of Russia’s nation-
al revival36. The news about the Freedom of Worship Manifesto issued by Nicho-
las II in April 1905 received special attention on the other side of the Atlantic. 
George von Lеngerke Meyer, the US Ambassador to Russia and the US President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s close friend greeted it with much enthusiasm,37 while, as 
David Foglesong rightly notes, the Adventists, such as Ludwig Richard Conradi, 
and the Methodists, such as George Simons, saw the Manifesto as a signal to step 
up their campaigns to spread “the true faith” through the Russian Empire.38 At the 
same time, the Missionary Review of the World published an article, whose author 
turned to the all-too-familiar comparison of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires 
as states with no political or civil freedoms, where the rulers were reluctant to 
introduce reforms and eager to cancel them afterwards, and emphasized that even 
though Russia’s 70 million peasants did need both religious and civic guidance, 
the Protestant missionaries would not be successful there, unless they accepted 
the leadership of the Young Men’s Christian Association and collaborated with 
the Orthodox Church.39
Discussions about the religious reform in the Russian Empire helped to turn 
it into an object of the US world-reforming mission. In the first half of 1905, “the 
Roosevelt’s books The American Ideals and The Strenuous Life on Father Gapon: V. 
Bienstock, “Father George Gapon,” Independent Vol. 58 (February 1905): 352. 
34 “The Russian Situation,” Arena Vol. 33 (February 1905): 210-213.
35 “The Lines of Russian Reform,” Nation Vol. 80 (June 1905): 450; Charles Johnston, 
“The Leaders of the Russian People,” Harper’s Weekly Vol. 49 (August 1905): 1226, 1243.
36 Thompson, Hart, The Uncertain Crusade, 75; Noble, “America and the Russian 
Crisis,” Free Russia (March 1905), 35.
37 George von Lеngerke Meyer to John Hay, May 5, 1905 in: Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS), 1905, (Washington: the US Department of State,1906), 76 ; George 
von Lеngerke Meyer to Theodore Roosevelt, May 5, 1905, in: Mark Antony De Wolfe 
Howe, George von Langerke Meyer. His Life and Public Services (New York, Dodd Mead, 
1920), 149. 
38 Foglesong, “Redeeming Russia? American Missionaries and Tsarist Russia, 
1886-1917,” Religion, State and Society Vol. 25, no 4 (1997): 356-357; Foglesong, “The 
American Mission and the ‘Evil Empire’”, 34-36.
39 George Washburn, “The Government, Church, and the People,” Missionary Review 
of the World Vol. 28, (September 1905): 641-642, 645-646.
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crusade spirit” hovered over America, and the Russians were placed next to the 
Cubans in the messianic plans of political and public leaders, religious activists, 
philanthropists, and journalists. Plans to give real help to the Russian people in 
their struggle for freedom were discussed in earnest on the pages of newspapers 
and magazines, in clubs and at mass rallies, at churches and universities, in trade 
union and immigrant societies, at business and charity meetings. Proposals in-
cluded sending over ships loaded with weapons, food, medicine, and, most impor-
tantly, printed materials—political pamphlets explaining the principles of Ameri-
can democracy and religious ones expounding the advantages of rational faith. 
Telegrams, petitions, editorials, and resolutions addressed to the President 
and the Secretary of State contained demands for more drastic actions: break-
ing diplomatic relations, denouncing the Russian-American Trade and Navigation 
Treaty of 1832, excluding Russia from participation in the next Hague confer-
ence, turning US embassies and consulates on Russian territory into safe havens 
for political and religious dissidents, and, finally, organizing a “humanitarian in-
tervention” similar to the Cuban campaign during the Spanish-American War. 
The Russian version of such a campaign would include sending a military fleet 
over to the Gulf of Finland, from where Saint-Petersburg could be attacked in 
case of necessity.40 Such rhetoric greatly inspired Russian Revolution-makers 
who were not always aware of how fickle the general mood could be in the US 
and of the fact that “the crusade spirit” of the Progressivism epoch did not always 
turn into real actions. 
Political cartoons published in the first half of 1905 serve as an excellent indi-
cator of American public preferences, related not only to the real events in Russia, 
but also to their own visions of an ideal revolution, their messianic enthusiasm, 
ideological zeal, and politi-
cal ideals. Playing with the 
images of Darkness and 
Light became the cartoon-
ists’ favorite communica-
tive strategy for represent-
ing American messianic 
sentiments. In their draw-
ings, “the Sun of Freedom” 
rose time and again, com-
ing from over the ocean 
towards “the Empire of 
Darkness” in order to dis-
perse the clouds of “Ig-
norance”, “Oppression”, 
“Anarchy”, and “Assas-
sination” and to shine the 
light of “Peace”, “Prosper-
40 Thompson, Hart, The Uncertain Crusade, 19-20. 
Figure 4. Hands across the sea.
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ity”, and “Intelligence” over the Russian people41. Hands full of American dollars 
were stretched across the ocean from the land of Light to the victims of Jewish 
pogroms in the land of Darkness.42 (Figure 4)
Frederick Morgan’s 4th of July cartoon expresses these messianic sentiments 
most clearly. In it, Uncle Sam holds a torch that sends “sparks of freedom and in-
dependence” flying over the head of a chained muzhik, representing Russia. Packs 
of dollars are scattered around the prisoner’s feet, and he asks, looking at Sam’s 
happy face: “I wonder if I’ll ever have а glorious fourth like that?” This text has a 
double meaning, since it reflects both the messianic impulse felt by the Americans 
and their perception of Russia as a “dark twin” of the United States43. (Figure 5)
John McCutcheon entered into direct dialogue with this text through his inge-
nious cartoon that visualized Russia’s image as the “Other” of the United States: 
41 Chicago Daily Tribune, January 31, 1905; New York World, February 25, 1905; 
Columbus Evening Dispatch, November 1, 1905. See also the cartoon from the Minneapolis 
Tribune, reprinted in the Literary Digest Vol. 27, (July 18, 1903). 
42 Chicago Daily Tribune, November 13, 1905.
43 Philadelphia Inquirer, July 4, 1905.
Figure 5. The Glorious Fourth.
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Roosevelt receives greetings from his jubilant people on the day of his inaugu-
ration, graced by fireworks and the American national anthem, while a horrified 
Nicholas II awaits his last hour, hearing the thunder of the Japanese cannons, sur-
rounded by bombs, insurgents, and revolutionaries who curse him while waving red 
flags and brandishing knives. The caption functions as a semantic code : “U.S.A.—
RuSsIa.”44 (Figure 6)
Drawing parallels between the Russian Revolution and the two major 18th-
century revolutions—the American and the French—became one of the favorite 
communicative strategies in American representations, and this communicative 
strategy demonstrated that the Americans considered the Russian Revolution 
to be a political movement of the Western type.45 However, the American and 
the French models played different roles: the first one was a reference, while the 
second was used as a reminder about the dangers of social chaos, anarchy, and 
terror that accompanied an all-out destruction of the “old order”. According to 
Michael Hunt, even the French who stood next to the Anglo-Saxons in race hi-
erarchy had not proved capable to follow the American revolutionary script, for 
even small differences in national character had produced quite divergent political 
behaviors,46 and the Russians would do well to take into account the sad experi-
ence of the French. This kind of reasoning explains the large number of references 
to the French Revolution made by the press as well as by the American diplomats, 
businessmen, public and political leaders. This comparison was first made in late 
1904, when zemtsy held their assembly in Moscow,47 and remained important all 
throughout the First Russian Revolution.
44 Chicago Daily Tribune, March 6, 1905.
45 “Is a Russian Revolution Imminent?”, Harper’s Weekly Vol. 49, (May 1905): 640; 
“The Representative Institution Proposed for Russia,” Harper’s Weekly Vol. 49 (May 
1905): 785.
46 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 117.
47 See, for example: “Is there Hope of Self-Government for Russia?”, Harper’s 
Weekly Vol. 48 (December 1904): 1832-1833.
Figure 6. March Fourth.
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The Ambassador George von Lеngerke Meyer filled his letters and dispatches 
with references to the revolutionary France of the late 18th century. In December 
1905, he compared Witte to Necker, the Duma to the General Estates, and Nicho-
las II to Louis XVI and lamented that the Russian Tsar had not given himself time 
to study the sad story of his French counterpart. In January 1907, as he observed 
an interminable train of assassination attempts, von Lengerke Meyer reminisced 
about the Jacobin terror and the Paris Commune in a letter to his wife.48 The 
American Consul in Warsaw agreed that the current Russian situation brought to 
mind the “Great Terror” of the French revolutionary epoch.49 The Putilov work-
ers’ strike in January 1905 was compared with the disturbances that preceded the 
break-out of the French revolution. Commentators drew parallels between the 
August law on the election of deputies to the “Bulygin’s Duma” and the convoca-
tion of notables and then of the General Estates by Louis XVI50.
The historical reference models of the Russian Revolution that, one after an-
other, came to dominate the American discourse allow us to evaluate the overall 
evolution of its American representations. This process of using the historical 
past in the construction of the “Other” national image has an underlying general 
logic: the movement from the precedent images of the Western-type revolution-
ary movements (from the American revolution as the ideal to the French one as a 
warning) to the “Revolution à la russe”. 
II. Crossing the limits of the acceptable in revolution: on the wave of 
disappointments
There is no doubt that political terrorism and growing social tensions within 
the Russian Empire did preoccupy the American radical and partly liberal reform-
ers, and not just the Conservatives. However, press analysis allows us to draw a 
firm conclusion that some observers enchanted with the Russian Revolution had 
condoned political murder, albeit indirectly and temporarily, as a means of speed-
ing up political modernization in countries as backward as Russia.
This trend became apparent as early as July 1904, when the reactionary Min-
ister of Internal Affairs, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Plehve was assassinated, 
because he impeded the progress of reforms. At that time, most American peri-
odicals would have concurred with the Philadelphia Press that called Plehve’s 
murder “a natural retribution for his crimes,”51 because “the bomb was still a re-
former’s weapon in Russia,” where the reformers had to contend with despotism 
and arbitrary power.52 Samuel Harper, a Liberal and a Russophile who was in Rus-
sia at that time, reported than even members of conservative circles approved the 
48 Howe, George von Langerke Meyer, 233-234, 241, 327-328. 
49 Albert Leffinwell to Robert Bacon, December 1, 1905 in: National Archives and 
Record Service (NARS), Record Group (RG) 59, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Warsaw, 
Microfilm (M) 467, Reel (R) 3.
50 “Rioting in St. Petersburg,” Independent Vol. 58 (June 1905): 174; “The Russian 
Reforms,” New York Times, August 20, 1905.
51 Cited from the Literary Digest Vol. 29 (August 1904): 155.
52 Forum, Vol. 36 (October, 1904): 193-194.
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murder of this man, who became a symbol of ruthless repression, and that terror 
seemed politically justified, since it allowed to secure concessions.53
February 1905 brought another important political assassination—that of the 
Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, the Tsar’s uncle, close friend and adviser, 
Moscow’s governor-general and an ardent opponent of the reforms. The Ameri-
can press responded to this event with numerous publications arguing that this act 
of vengeance was provoked by Nicholas II himself, since his reluctance to make 
good on his promises induced further growth of the revolutionary violence. The 
murdered Grand Duke was known as “Ivan the Terrible” of modern Russia, since 
he was infamous for his depravity, cruelty, and unscrupulousness, as well as for 
his fanatic hatred of Jews, Protestants, and Catholics. This leader of the reaction-
ary party, a consistent champion of autocracy, and a convinced opponent of more 
enlightened forms of government for the Russian people was responsible for the 
Khodynka tragedy and for the disappearance of donations that the Russians had 
made to the Red Cross Society for helping soldiers wounded in Manchuria. The 
death of this individual was seen as an exceptional case, that of a political murder 
that could help to establish internal and external peace.54
Samuel Harper who monitored not only the events of the revolutionary Rus-
sia, but also the Americans’ reaction to them, ascertained that, at first, the lat-
ter found the terror justifiable: “The bombing of grand dukes was all right, and 
perhaps even the peasant attacks on landlords were understandable.”55 After all, 
this seemed to be the Russian way to freedom. Terror was also accepted by mem-
bers of American Friends of Russian Freedom societies as a legitimate means of 
struggle against autocracy, since it was supposed to facilitate the establishment of 
a Western-style parliamentary regime. After the assassination of the Grand Duke, 
Edmund Noble prepared a special survey for Free Russia, in which he emphasized 
that neither the American press, nor the US President had even attempted to make 
any analogies between the fate of the Grand Duke and those of the assassinated 
US Presidents—Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, and William McKinley.56
The March 1905 issue of the North American Review magazine featured a 
pamphlet entitled The Czar’s Soliloquy that sounded a clarion call to resist the ty-
rants and was written by Mark Twain, who was an old-time member of the Ameri-
can Friends of Russian Freedom movement. The pamphlet presented Nicholas II 
just after the “Bloody Sunday” as a puny naked man who had just come out of a 
53 Samuel N. Harper, The Russia I Believe In. The Memoirs of Samuel N. 
Harper. 1902-1941, Paul V. Harper, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1945), 20.
54 “Hated by Russian People. Sergius Called a Modern Ivan the Terrible,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, February 18, 1905; “Sergius Held Harsh Views,” San Francisco Examiner, 
February 19, 1905; “Sergius Hated Talk of Reform,” Atlanta Constitution, February 19, 
1905; “Aid to Peace in Sergius’ Death,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 19, 1905. See 
also the cartoons published by the Philadelphia Inquirer, February 18, 20, 1905; New York 
World, February 19, 1905; Life, March 9, 1905.
55 Harper, The Russia I Believe In, 29.
56 Noble, “American Views of Russian Assassination,” Free Russia (April 1905): 50-
51.
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bath and was looking at himself in a mirror, while the author, masked as another, 
imaginary monarch was evaluating and condemning him. Using the ironic para-
dox as his main artistic technique, Mark Twain made the masked antihero expose 
serious ideas about civilization, the human nature and the nature of power, true 
and fake patriotism, submission and the right to insurrection. Quotes from the 
New York and the London Times as well as the Tsar’s own comments masterfully 
woven into the text made it sound as a complete negation of autocracy’s very 
foundations and as an exoneration of the revolutionary violence against the Tsar.
Mocking the moralist’s musings about the viciousness of regicide, he pon-
tificates: “There is no Romanoff of learning and experience but would reverse 
the maxim and say: ‘Nothing politically valuable was ever yet achieved except 
by violence’. The moralist realizes that to-day, for the first time in our history, 
my throne is in real peril and the nation waking up from its immemorial slave-
lethargy ; but he does not perceive that four deeds of violence are the reason for 
it : the assassination of the Finland Constitution by my hand ; the slaughter, by 
revolutionary assassins, of Bobrikoff and Plehve; and my massacre of the unof-
fending innocents the other day. But the blood that flows in my veins—blood 
informed, trained, educated by its grim heredities, blood alert by its traditions, 
blood which has been to school four hundred years in the veins of professional 
assassins, my predecessors—it perceives, it understands! Those four deeds have 
set up a commotion in the inert and muddy deeps of the national heart such as no 
moral suasion could have accomplished; they have aroused hatred and hope in 
that long-atrophied heart; and, little by little, slowly but surely, that feeling will 
steal into every breast and possess it. In time, into even the soldier’s breast—fatal 
day, day of doom, that! [...] The nation is in labor; and by and by there will be a 
mighty birth—Patriotism! To put it in rude, plain, unpalatable words—true pa-
triotism, real patriotism: loyalty, not to a Family and a Fiction, but loyalty to the 
Nation itself!”57 
Assassinations of reactionaries in Russia were heartily welcomed by the in-
habitants of the New York East Side who harbored radical ideas, by the Socialist-
leaning periodicals created with the participation of Russian-Jewish immigrants, 
and by the American radicals in general, who saw the Russian Revolution as a 
great inspiration for the US Socialist movement that they considered to be still in 
its infancy.58 As the Revolution turned more radical and passed from the political 
to the social stage, respectable Americans grew increasingly disenchanted with 
what they considered to be the violation of permissible limits in making a revolu-
tion. The American Socialists, by contrast, grew ever more enthusiastic about it.
Jack London, who was a member of the US Socialist Party and one of the 
leaders of the most radical SAFRF—the Californian one, made a lecture tour of 
the US after “the Bloody Sunday” and presented his ideas about the meaning of 
the Russian Revolution and its special romanticism to students, businessmen, and 
57 Mark Twain, “The Czar’s Soliloquy,” North American Review Vol. 180 (March 
1905): 324.
58 Vladimir Simkhovich, “Terrorism in Russia,” International Quarterly Vol. 11 (July 
1905): 266-287; Thompson, Hart, The Uncertain Crusade, 70-73, 82.
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people of very diverse professions and political views. Jack London perceived this 
revolution as “the heroic battle for freedom is being fought almost exclusively by 
the Russian working-class under the intellectual leadership of Russian socialists”. 
This revolution inspired him by its fundamental difference from the Western ones. 
In March 1905, Jack London published Revolution—an article based on his 
lectures that justified political assassination: “There has never been anything like 
this revolution in the history of the world. There is nothing analogous between 
it and the American Revolution or the French Revolution. It is unique, colossal. 
Other revolution compare with it like asteroids compare with the sun […] It pass-
es over geographical lines, transcends race prejudice, and has even proved itself 
mightier than the Fourth of July, spread-eagle Americanism of our forefathers […] 
The government executes the revolutionists. The revolutionists kill the officers of 
the government. The revolutionists meet the legal murder with assassination […] 
I speak, and I think, of these assassins in Russia as ‘my comrades’. The worth is 
shown by the fact that we do back up the assassinations by our comrades in Rus-
sia. They are not the disciples of Tolstoy. Nor are we. We are revolutionists.”59
The strong-spirited character that had always been the focus of Jack Lon-
don’s literary work now had all the markings of a Russian Revolutionary, with his 
desperate heroism, sense of self-sacrifice, and a great gift for advocacy. The Iron 
Heel—London’s novel written between August and December 1906 and pub-
lished in 1907—was the result of his reflections about the Russian Revolution.60
Yet those who thought that political assassination was an admissible meth-
od for politically backward countries were far from being the majority in the 
American society. Talks about “Russia backsliding into Nihilism” and about the 
extraordinary activity of the revolutionary party made up of “Nihilists and bomb-
throwers” began right after Plehve’s murder.61 Some have even gone as far as 
seeing this act as a proof that the Russians were “Oriental” and incapable of gov-
erning themselves.62 As the use of political terror in Russia kept growing, the 
Americans evaluations of this method of political struggle began to shift from 
positive to negative, and this change of attitude indicated that the Universalist 
euphoria and the enchantment with the Russian Revolution were on the decline in 
the American society.
After the assassination of the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, even the 
New York Times that had always denounced absolutism as the cause of revolution-
ary violence remarked that “this awful crime” impeded the restoration of order 
and the advancement of freedom in Russia.63 The Atlanta Constitution—a news-
paper that supported the Democratic Party—published Lewis Gregg’s ambivalent 
59 Jack London, “Revolution,” in: Revolution and Other Essays (London& New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1910), 12-14, 16-17. 
60 Jack London, The Iron Heel (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908).
61 “The Recrudescence of Nihilism,” Harper’s Weekly Vol. 48 (August 1904): 1237-
1238; “Revolutionary Progress in Russia,” Review of Reviews Vol. 30 (September 1904): 
280. 
62 Thompson, Hart, The Uncertain Crusade, 23.
63 New York Times, February 20, 21, 23, 1905.
Victoria I. Zhuravleva, American Phenomenology of the Russian Revolution 89
cartoons, one of which, entitled “Who is next?” presented a terrifying spirit of 
the Russian Revolution with a bomb in its hands hovering over the Grand Duke’s 
lifeless body. In another cartoon, Gregg drew some drunken Russian Nihilists 
who were amusing themselves in a “bomb-shooting gallery” that had the figures 
of Russian Grand Dukes as targets.64 Claudius Maybell from another Democratic-
leaning independent newspaper The Brooklyn Eagle later took up this theme of 
“bomb-throwing as a special kind of sport and diversion” in Russia and created 
the image of a “Russian terrorist-
athlete” in a “shot put circle”. 
Authors of some publications 
took the assassination attempts 
against Russia’s high officials as 
evidence of the perverse meth-
ods used by Russian Revolution-
makers and of the dangerous 
trends of that Revolution. The 
Conservative Los Angeles Times 
published a cartoon, in which 
a peasant in a frock coat with 
a scroll of demands in his hand 
looked disapprovingly at an An-
archist armed with a bomb and 
a dagger and said bitterly: “And 
the world thinks he represents 
us.”65 (Figure 7)
Slightly later, on the pages 
of the Conservative Philadel-
phia Inquirer, Frederick Morgan 
presented the image of a Rus-
sian commoner in a Phrygian hat who looked like a French sans-culotte and was 
climbing out of the “Revolution” cauldron.66 (Figure 8)
Through these images and texts, the perception of the destructive Russian 
Revolution that resembled a spasm of the social organism got fixed in American 
representations. A politically respectable magazine the North American Review 
warned its readers that the Russian Revolution was so radical that it could not be 
compared even with the French Revolution, let alone with the American one, and 
insisted on the necessity of gradual learning about the foundations of parliamen-
tarism. Its Saint-Petersburg correspondent emphasized that “the Bloody Sunday” 
was the watershed, after which the Russian Revolution entered a new phase, char-
acterized by the disorganization of bureaucracy, mass strikes and conspiracies, 
64 Atlanta Constitution, February 19, 26, 1905. See also the February 20, 1905 issue 
for “Fear of Dread Bomb Grips Russ Royalty.”
65 Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1905. See also: Living Age Vol. 244 (March 1905): 
696.
66 Philadelphia Inquirer, July 1, 1905.
Figure 7. It is a mistake. 
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ubiquitous bloodshed and anarchy, and red and white terror. His conclusion was 
that, for the first time in Russian history, the autocracy had come to depend fully 
upon the Army and the police, while the entire society was being revolutionized. 
On one side of the trenches stood a feeble-minded Tsar that made and broke his 
promises, backed by the police that acted arbitrarily and instigated ethnic strife; 
on the other was the general insurrection, backed by bombs and dynamite.67
Andrew Dickson White, a diplomat and a historian, who in 1892-94 served as 
the US envoy to Russia and later as the first president of Cornell University, wrote 
a comprehensive article about the Russian crisis for the Collier’s magazine. In it, 
he argued that the autocratic bureaucracy stood in the way of Russia’s effective 
development, hindered the advancement of education, and suppressed individual 
initiative. Yet, at the same time, he expressed a deep mistrust of Russian reformers 
and revolutionaries—“Nihilists, Socialists, and Anarchists”. Like many American 
Conservatives, White insisted that constitutional government and parliamentary 
traditions could only be introduced by an enlightened people, and that the Rus-
sians did not fit into that category. Therefore, this American intellectual consid-
ered that the Russian autocracy had to reform itself first and then undertake the 
67 North American Review Vol. 180 (February 1905): 300; (April 1905): 620-626; 
(May 1905): 780-788.
Figure 8. The beginning of the end. 
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task of educating its “dark people.” Without this, the reforms would turn into a po-
litical farce.68 In the end, the participants of the Conservative-pessimist discourse 
about Russia were the first ones to begin describing the Russian Revolution as a 
meaningless and ruthless mutiny.
In general, Americans looked favorably upon the Russian Revolution as 
a possibility, but when it actually occurred and broke the prescribed scenario, 
it caused anxiety and disenchantment by its “dangerous trends”: the growth of 
social tensions, naval and army uprisings, strikes and lock-outs, the creation of 
workers’ deputies’ Councils (Soviets), and the never-ending Jewish pogroms—to 
sum, all the manifestations of Freedom-fighting that became known as the “Revo-
lution à la russe.”
A radical change in the American sentiments towards the First Russian Revo-
lution occurred in November-December 1905. The October general strike and the 
Tsar’s October 17th Manifesto that made provisions for introducing the freedoms 
of conscience, speech, assembly, and associations and also granted law-making 
powers to the Duma constituted an important watershed in American perceptions. 
Many American periodicals likened this Manifesto unto the Great Charter of Lib-
erties and compared the importance of the date of its adoption to July 4th, 1776 
in the US and to July 14th, 1789 in France.69 However, when these events were 
followed by a growing tide of social violence instead of the anticipated stabiliza-
tion, the euphoria of Universalism began to turn into the notion that the Russians 
were crossing the limits of the acceptable and that their revolution could plunge 
the country into anarchy and chaos. 
These changes in the American public preferences can already be detected in 
November 1905 press reviews, even though harsh criticisms of Nicholas II con-
tinued (especially in reformist publications).70 The Tsar’s cartoon images also re-
mained extremely negative: he was a weak-willed and frightened dwarf-ruler who 
had lost all power and control over the situation in his domain, and the only free-
doms he had granted to the Russian people were those that he could not impede 
them to take by force.71 At the same time, the New York Tribune and the Chicago 
Examiner doubted whether the Russian society had sufficient self-governance ex-
perience to draw upon. The Chicago News observed that the majority of Russians 
would do well to go to school for a few years before starting to experiment with 
a republican form of government, while the Chicago Record Herald thought that 
the Russian Revolutionaries were as unreasonable as college freshmen.72
68 Cited from: Noble, “America and the Russian Crisis,” Free Russia (March 1905): 36.
69 “Сivil Liberty Proclaimed in Russia,” Outlook Vol. 81 (November 1905): 531; 
Johnston, “The Dawn of Liberty in Russia,” Harper’s Weekly Vol. 49 (November 1905): 
1630; “The Russian Magna Carta,” Review of Reviews Vol. 32 (December 1905): 656-657. 
70 “Civil Liberty in Russia,” Outlook Vol. 81 (November 1905): 544.
71 See, for example, the cartoons in the New York World, October 29, 1905; Chicago 
Daily Tribune, November 2, 1905; Harper’s Weekly (November 18, 1905); cover; 
Philadelphia Inquirer, December 7, 1905.
72 See press reviews in the Literary Digest Vol. 31 (November, 1905): 733; Noble, 
“American Views of the Russian ‘Self-Effacement’,” Free Russia (December 1905):129-
130.
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Figure 9. The Russian idea of freedom.
The cartoonists’ decision to abandon the romantic image of the Russian 
people (as did for example, Claudius Maybell in the drawing that he created in 
response to news about Jewish pogroms in Russia) helped forward the changes in 
the conceptions of the Russian Revolution.73 (Figure 9)
The tide of anti-Jewish violence that began to rise in the fall of 1905 with a 
pogrom in Odessa and grew again in the summer of 1906 with the Belostok po-
grom did much to stir the public opinion on the other side of the Atlantic and to 
make the Americans reject their romantic ideas about the Russian Revolution in 
general. While in 1903 diplomats and consuls, public leaders and priests, journal-
ists and cartoonists tended to demonize the political regime and censure the Rus-
sian authorities, now they talked about “the barbaric state” of the Russian society, 
73 Brooklyn Eagle, November 3, 1905. This cartoon was also used as illustration for a 
Literary Digest article entitled “Jewish Massacres with Official Approval,” Literary Digest 
Vol. 31 (November 1905): 732.
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contaminated by Judaeophobia and about the strength of anti-Semitic feelings 
among the Russian people.74 
Americans of Christian and Jewish faith reacted to the growth of anti-Jewish 
violence in Russia with heated protest meetings and mourning processions, nu-
merous press publications, Congress resolutions, and the creation of the National 
Aid Committee for Pogrom Victims. Together with rabbis and Jewish periodicals, 
the New York Times reprimanded the Christian clergy and the American press for 
their passivity.75 Meanwhile, the New York Evening Journal that formed part of 
William Hearst’s “newspaper empire,” entered into its characteristic sensation-
alist mode and summoned Americans to donate millions of dollars to help the 
Russian Jews and the American government—to take immediate action. William 
Hearst, who was campaigning for the New York Mayor’s office and thus needed 
the support of the Jewish East-Side, reminded one and all how he had helped to 
start the war for Cuban liberation in 1898 through his press campaign. Now this 
newspaper tycoon declared his readiness to make the Russian Jews the object of 
the American emancipatory mission.76 Such declarations, together with the politi-
cal cartoons, did much to stir his compatriots’ messianic sentiments.77 
Meanwhile, the influential leaders of the Jewish community, with Jacob 
Schiff first and foremost among them, tried to put pressure on the White House 
and the State Department in order to compel the Washington administration to 
engage in “humanitarian diplomacy,” citing the US “humanitarian intervention” 
in Cuba as a precedent.78 Yet, neither the President, nor the Secretary of State had 
any intention to take steps in that direction. In his letters to Jacob Schiff, President 
Theodore Roosevelt called Schiff’s proposal to create an international humanitari-
an coalition a chimera and insisted that such actions would be completely useless, 
while a war of all against all was going on in various parts of the Russian Empire 
and its authorities were incapable of restoring social order and of guaranteeing 
their subjects’ safety: “What would such a coalition do: enforce liberty or order—
restore the autocracy or install a republic? Therefore, it is evident we could do 
nothing, and where we can do nothing I have a horror of saying anything […] The 
74 Thomas Heenan to George von Lеngerke Meyer, June 29, November 8, 1905, in: 
NARS, RG 59, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Odessa, M 459, R 7; Albert Leffinwell 
to Robert Bacon, November 20, 1905, in: NARS, RG 59, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls 
in Warsaw, M 467, R 3; “The Life and Death Struggle in Russia,” Missionary Review Vol. 
29 (January 1906): 59-62; “Russia and the Jews,” Living Age Vol. 247 (December 1905): 
681-683; “Jews Hacked to Bits by Russian Mobs,” Philadelphia Inquirer (December 13, 
1905); “Another Jewish Massacre in Russia,” Outlook Vol. 83, (June 1906): 394; Nation 
Vol. 83 (October 1906): 298. 
75 “American Aid to the Suffering Jews of Russia,” Literary Digest Vol. 31 (November 
1905): 773-774. 
76 Thompson, Hart, The Uncertain Crusade, 106-109; Moses Rischin, The Promised 
City. New York’s Jews, 1870-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 229-230.
77 See, for example, the double-spread of the Judge, September 30, 1905. 
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outrages on the Armenians were exactly the same as those perpetrated upon Jews 
of Russia both in character and in extent. But we did not go to war with Turkey.”79 
Overall, the growth of social tensions and political radicalism became the 
main factor that catalyzed the U turn in the American social preferences. The 
pages of newspapers and magazines were filled with reports about strikes and 
lock-outs, endless terrorist acts, unrest in the Army and the Navy, the December 
armed uprising, and the peasant riots. The authors began to talk about a civil war, 
in which workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, as well as ethnic and religious 
minorities entered into an armed struggle against those that they saw as their 
oppressors—the government, the capitalists, the landed gentry, and the Army of-
ficers. The discussion now revolved around the metamorphoses of the freedom 
struggle in Russia, the transformation of the political revolution into a social one, 
whose prospects looked gloomier every day. The word “anarchy” became a pecu-
liar kind of semantic code that was especially frightening for Americans, as were 
the musings about the October Manifesto that gave millions of illiterate Russian 
peasants more freedoms than they could handle, given their complete lack of self-
government experience.80 In Samuel Harper’s apt summary, “while there had been 
sympathy for the Revolution before it came, it caused concern when it in fact 
developed.”81
Finally, the change of public mood in the USA was also a reaction to the out-
come of the Russo-Japanese War. After the Portsmouth Conference, the American 
investment in Russia began to grow, while the relations between the Washington 
and the Tokyo governments grew colder, which in turn produced a decrease of 
Japanophilia within the American society. All of this favored the diffusion of more 
nuanced perceptions about the official Russia. 
The latter trend was also strengthened by the hopes that were placed on Ser-
gei Yulievich Witte. His good performance as the Minister of Finance, his posi-
tion in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, his skillful negotiation tactics during 
the Portsmouth Conference, and, finally, his role in the drafting of the October 
Manifesto all added to his prestige. To the American observers, Witte seemed just 
the kind of strong leader that could save Russia from its descent into revolution-
ary chaos and anarchy and coach its gradual renewal through reforms. In sum, he 
appeared to be the much-needed “Russian Lincoln” who could free the Russian 
people from the shackles of political and civil slavery.82 Positive evaluations of 
79 Theodore Roosevelt to Jacob Schiff, December 14, 1905, in: The Letters of 
Theodore Roosevelt (LTR), Elting E., Morrison, ed., in 8 Vols., Vol. 5 (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1952-1954),113. See also: Theodore Roosevelt to Oscar Straus, April 10, 
1906; Theodore Roosevelt to Jacob Schiff, July 26, 1906, in: Ibidem, 207, 336.
80 Chicago Daily Tribune, October 28, November 3, December 29, 1905; Christian 
Advocate, November 9, 1905; New York Herald, November 28, 1905; World Today 
(December, 1905): 1255-1256; Literary Digest Vol. 31 (November 1905): 688; (December 
1905): 867; George F. Wright, “The Russian Peasant,” Nation Vol. 81 (November 1905): 
441-442; “World-Politics,” North American Review Vol. 182 (January-June 1906): 303-
309.
81 Harper, The Russia I Believe In, 29.
82 Isidore Singer, “Sergius de Witte and the Bankruptcy of Russia,” Independent 
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Witte’s performance dominated the press, even though his image in the American 
socio-political discourse was not all rosy, especially due to his readiness to turn 
to the repressive measures advocated by the Police Chief and Saint Petersburg’s 
Governor-General Dmitri Fedorovich Trepov. Illusions about Witte had, albeit 
temporarily, softened the criticisms directed at the official Russia, even as the 
political revolution turned into a social one. Yet, by early 1906, Witte’s image 
started to lose its romantic aura, as it became increasingly clear that this “Russian 
Necker” could not handle the situation, and was losing confidence both of the rul-
ing circles and of the Liberal opposition.83 This evolution from the model of the 
American Revolution (the “Russian Lincoln”) to the model of the French Revolu-
tion (the “Russian Necker”) was very symptomatic per se. 
In November-December 1905, the American political cartoonists, who were 
taking an active part in the formation of simplistic images of the Russian Revolu-
tion (be they romantic or demonic), illustrated the irreversible turn of the Russian 
Revolution into a bloody life-or-death skirmish, a wild bacchanal of Nihilists, 
peasants, and workers.84 The Moscow armed insurrection of December 1905 was 
harshly condemned by the American press that wrote about the ungrateful Rus-
sians who went to the barricades and ignoring the opportunity they had to create 
a constitutional regime. What is more, the Russian government was accused of 
not being decisive enough in restoring order in the country and exposing the sur-
rounding countries to the risk of catching “the revolutionary disease.”85 
The last upsurge of general interest for the Russian Revolution in the USA 
was related to the convocation of the first Duma in April 1906. Many American 
observers initially thought it to be the exit from social chaos and financial crisis, 
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the basis for a peaceful transformation of the autocratic regime into a constitution-
al one, the beginning of a real fight for freedom, and the chance to avoid the Rus-
sian versions of both the Jacobin dictatorship and the Thermidor reaction86. Yet, 
in spite of all these hopes, the prospects of a Duma dominated by Constitutional 
Democrats (Kadets) and Radicals caused heated discussions and ambivalent com-
ments within the American society. Some felt inspired by the election results, see-
ing them as the proof of that the Russians were in fact ready for a constitutional 
government and hoping that the Duma would be able to stand up to the forces 
of the old order. Others were pessimistic in their forecasts, due to Witte’s loss of 
prestige and his subsequent dismissal in April 1906, which seemed to make more 
difficult the dialogue between the State and the Duma. Yet others talked about the 
apathetic peasants, incapable of comprehending the very idea of a representative 
government, let along their rights and obligations within it. Some pointed to the 
financial and moral bankruptcy of the Russian authorities, to the discredited Nich-
olas II who was hardly capable of taking into account the lessons of the French 
Revolution and avoiding the fate of Louis XVI. They doubted that the Russian 
aristocracy could avoid the mistakes made by the French aristocracy and that the 
Duma deputies would be wiser than the deputies of the National Assembly.87 The 
image of the French Revolution was still used as a precedent and a warning, while 
parallels with the late 18th-century events in France had completely displaced the 
ideas about “the Russian 1776” that prevailed in the early 1905.88
Even though the American press was generally sympathetic towards the first 
Russian experience in popular representation and continued to criticize “the Rus-
sian Louis XVI”, the demands made by the Duma deputies had not found favor 
with the American public that considered them to be too radical. Indeed, it was 
hard to make sense of such proposals as universal suffrage for a country where 
the majority of the population could neither read nor write, or universal amnesty 
and abolition of the death penalty, while terrorism and crime were rampant and 
were said to be means of political struggle, or the dissolution of the Duma’s up-
per chamber that was the only institution capable of restraining the unreasonable 
ideas of the lower chamber, or the obligatory alienation of lands without compen-
sation, demanded by the Labor group in the Duma (trudoviki). The high hopes 
that the Americans placed on the Constitutional Democrats were frustrated, as the 
kadets proved incapable of directing the revolutionary movement into the chan-
nel of parliamentary competition and, with reckless impatience, rejected gradual 
86 “Evolution or Revolution,” Outlook Vol. 82 (April 1906): 924-925; H.M. William, 
“Is the Russian Revolution Constructive?”, North American Review Vol. 33 (April 1906): 
464-466; “Duma and Tsar,” New York Sun, June 18, 1906; “New Epoch in Russia,” 
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87 “How the Elections Went,” Review of Reviews Vol. 33 (June 1906): 657-658; 
Dillon, “The First Session of the First Parliament: A Forecast,” Contemporary Review Vol. 
84 (May 1906): 744-748; “World-Politics,” North American Review Vol. 182 (January-
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reforms and dialogue with the authorities. On the other hand, American observers 
lamented the inability of the Russian people to advance strong political leaders 
from their own ranks – the defect that was readily ascribed to affectivity and im-
practicality that were so characteristic of the Russian national character.89
After the dissolution of the First Duma, voices that urged Russia to learn 
the main lesson of American Progressivism grew ever stronger. Reforms were 
to be carefully designed and prepared and were meant to improve the existing 
system, not to destroy it, while the Russian revolutionaries wanted to renew Rus-
sia through destruction, terror, and anarchy. Even the radical Independent that 
had been discussing the possibility that “the Socialist Gospel” would take root in 
Russia à la française, through the realization of the destructive component of its 
revolution, now insisted that historical parallels of any kind between Russia and 
France of the late 18th-century no longer worked.90 The eventual rejection of the 
Western historical precedent images (of the American and the French Revolu-
tions) indicated that the Americans no longer perceived the Russian Revolution as 
the Western-style movement.
While in 1906 the Revolution was only beginning according to many Rus-
sians, for the majority of Americans it was already over, because it had degen-
erated into a universal insurrection of the people against their government, an 
insurrection that was fraught with political and social chaos and symbolized the 
nation’s regress from civilization to barbarism. The American press insisted that 
the Russian Revolution had chosen riots, strikes, and terrorist acts as its main 
weapons,91 and that its destructive forces had manifested themselves most clearly 
in Poland and in the Caucasus. The murder of the American Consul William Stu-
art in Batumi on May 20th, 1906 was cited as the best proof of this revolutionary 
mayhem.92 The events in the Russian Empire had demonstrated that the Russian 
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people could only reach freedom 
through enlightenment and educa-
tion, since freedom and revolution 
à la russe were the fruits of popu-
lar ignorance. Robert Carter has 
captured this dominant opinion in 
a visual image that has contribut-
ed to the formation of a long-term 
American vision of the Russian 
revolution, its logic and general 
scheme.93 (Figure 10)
In 1906, periodicals still pub-
lished reports about the Poles’ 
fight for Independence; there were 
also calls for granting autonomy to 
Finland and denunciations of re-
pressions and government terror. 
Champions of radical discourse 
were still inspired by the depth and breadth of social revolution in Russia, while 
Liberal-universalists stressed the great importance of Russia’s first parliamentary 
experience. However, on the whole, the euphoria of universalism was replaced 
by rancid Russophobia, and the myth of the “immutable Russia” returned to the 
center stage. Americans were no longer interested in the revolution on the other 
side of the ocean, and this disappointment in the outcomes of the First Russian 
Revolution was very well demonstrated by the disappearance of “Russian car-
toons” from the American periodicals. The political cartoons that were at once the 
indicator of the social mood and the mechanism for the formation of new prefer-
ences now transmitted the image of Russia as a country that has proved unable to 
assimilate the Western experience and remained hostile and alien. While the po-
litical cartoons simplified the “Russian picture” and fixed the two central images 
of the Russian revolution (the romantic and the demonic), verbal texts captured 
the perceptions of the Russian Revolution in a much more nuanced manner that 
makes it possible to distinguish between different images, produced by the Con-
servative, the Russophile, the Liberal-Universalist, and the Radical discourses. 
A good example of the Conservative discourse is found in the writings and re-
flections of George von Lеngerke Meyer, the US Ambassador to Russia, who has 
exerted a significant influence on the perceptions that the American Conservative 
establishment, and especially Theodore Roosevelt, formed about the prospects of 
the Russian Revolution. The Ambassador wrote to the President: “Russia is enter-
ing upon a great experiment, ill-prepared and really uneducated […] The great 
mass of the Russian people are not much superior to animals with brutal instincts 
[…] Every step or attempt that has been carried on in a revolutionary way has been 
made without reference to what has gone on before or what is to follow. They do 
93 Reprinted in Literary Digest Vol. 32 (June 1906): 967.
Figure 10. The Foe in Freedom’s Path. 
Victoria I. Zhuravleva, American Phenomenology of the Russian Revolution 99
not know what they want, except that they want everything at once – what has 
taken other nations generations to acquire.”94 Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt 
himself saw the causes of the first Revolution’s sterility in the fact that it was “led 
by leaders of the Gorki type” or “the silly visionary creatures who follow Tolstoi 
and his kind.” In Roosevelt’s view, Russia’s future directly depended on whether 
it could adopt the values of the Western development model and to stay on the 
road of gradual modernization, avoiding the extremes of anarchy and despotism.95 
In their turn, the American Russophiles, such as the well-known translator 
Isabel Hapgood, came to the conclusion that the Russian people needed control 
and leadership of a monarchy, since they were prone to fall into anarchy and 
recklessness. This conclusion resonated with the utterances of the American Con-
servatives about Russians not being ready for self-government, although, unlike 
the Conservatives, Hapgood did not consider the Russian national character to be 
an insurmountable obstacle on the way to progress. What forms this progressive 
development would take and at what speed it would occur was a different matter.96
American Liberal-Universalists thought that the principal gain of the Rus-
sian Revolution was to set the stage for parliamentarism and did not lose from 
sight those political visitors who kept coming to the United States from Russia in 
search of moral and material aid and adding new fuel to the fire of American Uni-
versalist Liberalism as the American society got progressively disenchanted with 
the outcomes of the First Russian Revolution. Taking stock of the 1905 Revolu-
tion ten years later, George Kennan, the father of the first American crusade for a 
Free Russia, identified three criteria of a successful revolution : its goals, its social 
bases of support, and knowledgeable and capable leaders that react sensitively to 
the changes in the political situation. According to this scheme, the main short-
coming of the First Russian Revolution was precisely the lack of competent lead-
ers that could have set adequate goals and consolidate the Russian society in order 
to achieve them. Neither the kadets, nor the Saint-Petersburg Council (Soviet) of 
Worker Deputies could accomplish this mission, much as they had tried. George 
Kennan’s sense of where the limits of the Russian Revolution lay was consistent 
with his notion that this revolution was a political movement of the Western type 
that would have a tangible and predictable result, equally valued by all social 
strata : a constitutional regime, democratization, and a gradual process of solv-
ing the most pressing social and economic problems within the private property 
framework and without violent spasms of the social organism.97
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By contrast, the American Radicals neither made analogies between the Rus-
sian Revolution and the American and the French ones, nor based their vision of it 
upon precedent historical models. They thought that the First Russian Revolution 
was an unprecedented event and, as such, found it very inspiring for those who 
thought that the American society itself needed renewal. Representatives from 
various currents of American radicalism, Socialist or not, constructed their own 
ideological identities as they reflected upon this Revolution. The “Gentlemen-
Socialists,” such as William English Walling, Arthur Bullard, Durland Kellogg, 
made a special contribution to the formation of a radical discourse about Russia. 
Like the Marxists, they thought that the essence of the Russian revolution was 
in its social dimension, but considered the peasants to be the carriers of social 
democracy. According to them, the road to Socialism passed not through the in-
dustrial capitalism, but through a «peasant revolution». Like Kennan and other 
Liberal “crusaders,” they took the negative traits of the Russian national character 
to be the result of a despotic regime and were confident that the Russians were 
capable of building a democracy. Yet they saw the significance of the Russian 
Revolution in the uniqueness of the social message it was sending to the entire hu-
manity, and not in a movement for the creation of “the United States of Russia.”98
All these discourses maintained their place in the American society through 
1906-07, even though the Conservative discourse, with its characteristic Rus-
sophobia and the emphasis on the “eternal Oriental,” became dominant. Rus-
sian Liberals could not give the Revolution a constructive course, and its people 
lacked education, were not ready for a representative form of government, and did 
not know how to use their freedom. While the Revolution was coming to its end in 
Russia, the first “cycle of hopes and disappointments” about Russia’s moderniza-
tion prospects was ending in the US. 
Conclusion 
The American attention to the First Russian revolution has actualized the role 
of the Russian “Other” in the analysis of the American domestic agenda. This 
phenomenon became reflected in the deliberations of the political and intellectual 
establishment, public and religious leaders, journalists and political writers, as 
well as in the drawings of the editorial cartoonists. Parallels between Russia and 
the US were drawn not only in order to criticize Russia or the domestic political 
situation in the US, but also in order to demonstrate that the United States, in 
spite of its imperfections and social conflicts, remained a bastion of freedom and 
democracy in comparison to the Russian Empire. 
First, mass disturbances in the Russian Empire during the 1905 Revolution 
were compared to the social unrest in the US, especially to the events in Chicago, 
the city that became the center of the workers’ movement and the site of the pow-
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erful May 1905 strike that was marked by the protesters’ bloody clashes with the 
police.99 American Russophiles pointed to the social unrest in Chicago in order to 
highlight that Americans who criticized Russians would do well to pay more at-
tention to the events at home. Meanwhile, the conservative press had appropriated 
the image of “Russian nihilist bomb-throwers” as the symbol of the hostile “Oth-
er” and used it in its critique of the US political radicalism in order to show that 
this phenomenon was completely alien to the American model of development 
and had been brought in by immigrants. For example, the editorial cartoonist of 
the Los Angeles Times represented peaceful citizens of Russia, Chicago, and War-
saw who used brick-proof umbrellas to protect themselves from both the bombs 
thrown by the strikers and the bullets fired by the army that confronted them.100 
Second, Russia’s image was used on a broader scale as a negative marker in 
the discussions of the sour points of domestic political development, as the Amer-
ican society was going through a period of racial confrontations, social unrest, and 
ideological disenchantments. Thus, the Grand Dukes of Russia were mentioned 
in critiques of political bossism, the captains of the US industry were called Si-
berian wolves, despots, and bloody autocrats of the monopolist world, who lived 
in luxury and sent their “personal Cossacks” to disperse workers’ strikes. Boston 
and New York slum dwellers were said to be no better off than the inhabitants of 
the miserable huts and hovels in the Tsar’s domain, etc.101.
Third, the 1905 Revolution provided a new mold for the analogy between 
the abolition of slavery in the US and the end of serfdom in Russia that was com-
monly used on both sides of the Atlantic and had a tradition of growing stronger 
whenever the bilateral relations became closer. The opposition Freedom-Slavery 
that was already integrated into the American discourse about Russia, thanks to 
the efforts of the participants in the first «crusade» for the cause of Russian free-
dom, had now acquired new overtones. The image of Abraham Lincoln was thus 
established as a firm reference for all occasions when Americans had to form an 
idea about the current figure that “liberated the Russian people from the shackles 
of political and spiritual slavery,” be it Sergei Witte in 1905, Pavel Miliukov in 
1917, Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1974, or Boris Yeltsin in 1991.102
Forth, the anti-Semitism problem in the Russian Empire resembled the rac-
ism issue in the US. The search for analogies between the Jewish pogroms and 
the lynching of African Americans and the state policies towards these two ethnic 
groups had turned into a very common communicative strategy. The critics of rac-
ism in the United States compared the “Jim Craw laws” with Russian anti-Jewish 
laws, drunken White Americans who lynched Black Americans with vodka-in-
toxicated Russian peasants killing Russian Jews. Atlanta, the site of an especially 
cruel African American pogrom in 1906, was compared to Kishinev. Quite un-
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Figure 11. Welcome, Russia!
Figure 12. Going home.
derstandably, these kinds of analogies were faithfully reproduced by the official 
and semi-official Russian press and eagerly used by the Tsarist government and 
its diplomats every time when the US seemed ready to intervene into the solution 
of the “Jewish question” in Russia. At 
the same time, quite a few others used 
Russia as the “dark twin” of the US 
and insisted that the Jewish pogroms 
in Russia were infinitely worse than 
the ones against African Americans. 
At the other extreme of the social 
spectrum, some white Southerners re-
ferred to Pleve’s murder in Russia in 
order to show that lynch trials could at 
times be justified.103
The American enthusiasm for the 
First Russian Revolution as the cli-
max of the first American crusade for 
Russia’s democratization has played 
an important role in the creation of the 
American phenomenology of the Rus-
sian revolution as such. 
After the end of the 1905-1907 
Revolution the “romantic” image of 
103 For further details on the subject of Jewish pogroms vs. African American pogroms 
dichotomy, see Zhuravleva, Ponimanie Rossii v SShA, 468-487, 694-704.
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Russia did not resurge until the 
wake of the 1917 February Revo-
lution. It became dominant once 
more in winter and in spring104 
(Figure 11-12); by the fall it was 
already replaced by a worrisome, 
although not yet altogether nega-
tive image of the Russian Bear who 
was drunk senseless on freedom105 
(Figure 13), and in November the 
«demonic» image of Russia that 
had strayed from the «right path» 
was back again.106 (Figure 14)
The “romantic” and “demon-
ic” images of Russia that appeared 
in 1917 were constructed with the 
help of the communicative strate-
gies and the rhetorical devices that were honed during the First Russian Revolu-
tion and became an important mechanism for maintaining long-term American 
myths about Russia, both the Liberal-Universalist and the Conservative-pessimist 
varieties. The former included the faith in the capacity of the Russian people to 
carry out a Western-style revolution and the create “the United States of Russia,” 
the conviction that the Russian society was democratic by nature and oppressed 
by a retrograde and xenophobic 
government, and the belief that 
Russia’s historic destiny was 
to follow the trail blazed by the 
Western countries, with the US 
in the lead. The Conservative-
pessimist myths portrayed Rus-
sia as a country forever kept 
behind by its non-Western tradi-
tions and culture, linked the au-
thoritarian nature of its political 
system to the peculiarities of its 
national character. The Liberal 
myths gained ground during the 
ascending phase of the “cycle 
of hopes and disappointments,” 
the Conservative ones domi-
nated during the descending 
phases.
104 Life (May 10, 1917).
105 Judge (September 8, 1917).
106 New York World, November 9, 1917.
Figure 13. Loaded. But wait until he sobers up.
Figure 14. Guiding Him.
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Meanwhile, the carriers of the Radical discourse created a different, though 
no less mythologized image of the Russian revolutionary “Other.” Yet this was the 
only American discourse about Russia, in which it took on the role of a teacher 
and not of a student in what concerned the universal significance of its revolution-
ary message.
Both in 1905 and in 1917, the Americans “invented” romantic and demonic 
“mental images” of Russia on the basis of their ideology of progress and expan-
sion, their own vision of the ideal political and social arrangements, a true revolu-
tion, the place of the US in the world, and its role in the process of its democratiza-
tion and harmonization.
Throughout the entire 20th century, as the American society witnessed the 
events in the Russian Empire, USSR, or the post-Soviet Russia, it repeatedly os-
cillated between the universalistic euphoria and the myth of the “Immutable Rus,” 
the enthusiasm about rapid westernization of Russia and the pessimism on the 
account of its “orientalism,” and between the faith in the readiness of Russian 
civil society to break the grip of the rulers and in the liberals’ capacity to lead the 
constructive process of modernization on the one hand, and deliberations about 
the immutability of the Russian national character on the other. 
Americans experienced a feeling of discomfort, because it was impossible 
to denounce the evil in other countries, while the American society itself could 
easily become the object of a fierce critique and was in need of serious renewal 
(the metaphor of the “glass house”). Meanwhile, American reformism was clearly 
acquiring an international dimension. As a result, at the turn of the 20th century, 
the fight for freedom far beyond the US borders was already seen as an important 
tool for preserving democracy at home and as a peculiar mechanism for overcom-
ing the national identity crisis.
Americans that awaited the liberalization of the Russian Empire in 1905 and 
hoped for its speedy modernization tended to exaggerate both the scale of the 
changes that took place in Russia and the degree of American influence in the 
matter. It must be noted, that Russian liberals and radicals did much to perpetuate 
this trend, as they kept coming to the United States for moral and material support 
and appealing to the Americans’ messianic feelings and their faith in liberal uni-
versalism. By the turn of the 20th century, they and the American “friends of Rus-
sian freedom” had created a very particular image of the Russian revolutionary. 
It was for this reason that George Kennan, William Foulke, and Edmund Noble 
saw Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin as impostors who had usurped the fruits 
of the battle fought by Liberals such as Pavel Miliukov and “moderate Social-
ists” – Sergei Stepniak-Kravchinsky, Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Nikolai 
Chaikovsky, Aleksei Alad’in, etc. In this sense, Americans got caught in their own 
“imagological trap”.
During the First Russian Revolution, the eagerness to remake the Russian 
Empire into the image and the likeness of the United States had reached its peak 
and Russia became the object of the US world-reforming mission. The first Amer-
ican «crusade» for the democratization of Russia had provided the blueprint for 
the subsequent campaigns : for the liberalization of the Russian Empire in 1917, 
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of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and of post-Soviet Russia after 
the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. As David Foglesong 
persuasively demonstrates in his book The American Mission and the “Evil Em-
pire”, the crusade for Russia’s renewal also went on between these episodes of 
heightened activity, and this never-ending quest has strengthened the Americans’ 
faith in the special destiny of their country to be the torchbearer of freedom and 
democracy for all the people of the world. These developments have given rise 
to two important issues that still remain relevant in our days: the right of humani-
tarian intervention and the expediency of imposing American ideals on those to 
whom the Americans wanted to bring «the blessings of freedom», regardless of 
their own wishes.
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